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Preface 
National ratification of international environmental agreements is a prime example of post-agreement 
negotiations. It is often the first subprocess in a larger process of sustained negotiations that occur 
after international accords are concluded, focused on implementation of those accords. Certainly, 
implementation of negotiated agreements involves legal, political, verification, and enforcement 
activities at both domestic and international levels. Many of these activities, including ratification, 
are characterized by negotiations between various stakeholders to reach mutually beneficial and 
acceptable means to achieve national implementation of, and compliance with, treaty provisions. 
This paper places ratification negotiations within the larger conceptual context of post- 
agreement negotiations, with the goal of understanding and explaining problems of treaty compliance. 
An empirical analysis is conducted to assess the impact of various inherent and situational factors on 
problems in the ratification process. Ultimately, we are interested in identifying ways of improving 
the international negotiation process that initiated these later problems in implementation. 
Recommendations are offered in this regard. 
This research was funded, in part, by a grant from the United States Institute of Peace (Grant 
No. USIP-124-92s). It is part of larger study being conducted by the Processes of International 
Negotiation (PIN) Project concerning the post-agreement negotiation process. 
Is the international community entering an era of sustained negotiations on environmental 
issues? The allusion to the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development's (UNCED) 
goal of sustainable development is no accident. Sustained negotiation is the process by which 
sustainable development issues are likely to be resolved. 
Sustainable development expresses the viability of continued economic growth that is not 
destructive or wasteful of natural resources or the environment (see Brooks, 1992, for an extensive 
discussion on the range of definitions for the term "sustainable development"). Sustained negotiation 
is exemplified by mutually acceptable agreements that spawn dynamic cooperative systems, 
procedures, and structures which institutionalize a sustained dialogue on issues that cannot, hy their 
very nature, be resolved by a single agreement. Partial, incremental agreements tend to predominate 
on environmental issues due to scientific uncertainty concerning many of the prohlems and possihle 
solutions, and the need for continued learning about effects and consequences. Partial agreements 
are also customary because of the political uncertainty in devising fair and equitable approaches at 
a global level. Sustained negotiations ofien have no clear cut end-point. A prime manifestation of 
sustained negotiation is the frequently used convention-protocol mechanism (examples of which are 
the long-range transboundary air pollution in Europe and the ozone depletion conventions and 
protocols) in which a broad framework of principles is agreed to, followed by additional negotiations 
to specify the details (see Susskind and Ozawa, 1992, for a critique of this approach to treaty- 
making). 
Sustained negotiations present diplomats and policy makers with the challenge of progressively 
reframing the problems, adjusting strategies and perceptions, and refining solutions in post-agreement 
negotiations. UNCED has propagated such a system of post-agreement negotiation, dealing with 
climate change, biodiversity, deforestation, desertification, and others, which certainly will occupy 
the diplomatic, scientific, and interested nongovernmental communities well into the next century. 
The research community, in parallel, is confronted with new challenges of analyzing systems 
of partial, linked agreements and an increasingly fuzzy demarcation between negotiation and 
implementation. Another research question is that of effectiveness. Negotiation analysis, while 
focusing its attention on how process leads to outcomes (Kremenyuk, 1991), usually defines outcomes 
as agreements reached at the bargaining table. Many practitioners, on the other hand, conceive of 
negotiation outcomes not as the agreements themselves, but as the egectiveness of those agreements. 
Are agreements implemented at all and do they produce the intended impacts on the problem area that 
initiated negotiations in the first place? 
With the end of the cold war and East-West confrontation, many global and regional issues, 
which previously appeared intractable, now seem to be solvable. Negotiation has become a principal 
vehicle for international dispute resolution. Multilateral talks on nuclear and conventional arms 
reduction and a host of environmental issues have especially benefitted from the new political 
willingness on all sides to cooperate in settling age-old problems that threaten the security of the 
planet. The success of these negotiations, though, can only be determined by evaluating the 
effectiveness of thepost-agreement negotiation process -- the dynamics which occur at both national 
and international levels that may involve additional negotiations among domestic stakeholders and 
results, if successful, in compliance with the negotiated agreement. If we conceive of the negotiation 
process as encompassing joint problem-solving activities conducted in the hope of achieving 
integrative solutions, thepost-agreement negotiationprocess involves the transformation of words into 
concrete realities through compliance with agreements. It involves new actors and new fora, at both 
national and international levels, engaged in further negotiations -- this time focused on finding 
acceptable approaches to ratiaing and implementing negotiated agreements. In large part, the post- 
agreement negotiation process is the yardstick by which the quality and effectiveness of the 
negotiation process can be judged. 
The objective of this study is to initiate an analysis of the system of negotiations that continue 
after the initial negotiations conclude. Our assumption is that if we can diagnose reliably the 
problems and successes incurred in the post-agreement negotiation process, we can provide useful 
feedback to the initiating negotiation process -- identifying novel approaches and structures that can 
avert or alleviate difficulties that might trickle down into the implementation period. Thus, this 
study's goal is to instate a learning cycle, one in which the ultimate outcomes of the negotiation 
process offer meaningful recommendations to improve future negotiation processes. 
Conceptual Framework 
International conflict resolution through negotiation can be viewed as a multi-staged and 
interactive system for joint problem-solving. First, disputants engage in prenegoriation to diagnose 
and plan for a full-fledged negotiation search for mutually acceptable solutions. Second, through 
negotiation itself, disputants express their need for agreement. Finally, inpost-agreement negotiation, 
disputants engage in intensive joint problem-solving activities focused on ratifying, implementing, 
complying with, and perhaps, renegotiating, a solution. 
Unlike the prenegotiation and negotiation phases, the post-agreement negotiation period has 
received minimal attention by researchers. There has been some attention paid to the governance of 
negotiated agreements and the development of regimes that set the rules and procedures by which 
nations agree to implement, abide by, and settle disputes on certain issue areas (Haas, 1975; Krasner, 
1983). More recently, the regime concept has been applied to environmental issue areas and specific 
problems of national compliance with international and regional agreements have been assessed, many 
in connection with the framework convention on climate.change (Young, 1989; Thacher, 1991; Sand, 
1991; IIASA, 1992). 
Yet, basic research to establish an integrated conceptual framework of the post-agreement 
negotiation process is lacking. Young (1989, p. 12) expresses special dismay at the absence of such 
an integrated analytical construct in the field of international regimes, let alone the broader process 
of post-agreement negotiation. 
... much of the newly emerging literature on regimes is weak, particularly in analytic terms. 
The last decade has brought a surge of interest in the study of international regimes. We now 
have fairly extensive descriptive accounts of some specific regimes and some speculative ideas 
about phenomena such as regime change. Even so, the fundamental character of international 
regimes remains elusive, and there is nothing approaching consensus on the role of regimes 
in international society. Considering the pervasiveness of regimes at the international level, 
the resultant limits on the state of our knowledge of international regimes constitute a serious 
deficiency. 
A conceptual framework for the post-agreement negotiation process is presented in Figure 1 
and part of it -- the ratification subprocess, in particular -- is tested later in the paper using systematic 
empirical methods. The post-agreement negotiation process is depicted as having two interactive 
components -- the domestic and international -- in which negotiations continue at multiple levels, in 
new fora, and with new actors, after an international agreement has been struck, ultimately resulting 
in compliance or noncompliance. In the domestic component, there are three suhprocesses. First, 
ratification or acceptance of negotiated agreements by each national government that wishes to 
participate in the agreement is often required. Domestic ratification can be conceived of as a 
negotiation process in itself, bringing together the various domestic stakeholders who have an interest 
in some aspect of the agreement. After ratification, rule-making is required at a national level, by 
which laws and regulations are enacted to conform with the stipulations of the agreement. Such rule- 
making may require negotiations among domestic stakeholders in nongovernmental, as well as 
governmental, organizations. Finally, monitoring and reporting functions are performed to provide 
feedback on the success or failure of laws and regulations. Through these functions, a signatory 
nation to an environmental treaty can evaluate, monitor, and enforce national compliance with an 
international agreement. 
There are three subprocesses as well in the international component of the post-agreement 
negotiation process. First, there is the regime formation process in which the rules and procedures 
by which the negotiated agreement will be implemented and institutionalized are embedded. In regime 
operation, data concerning participant actions are collected, compliance is monitored, verified, and 
enforced, and disputes resolved. The final subprocess is that of regime adjustment, in which the 
rules, procedures, and targets originally established in the negotiated agreement might be modified 
in conjunction with new information collected on the effects of compliance and as science learns more 
about the issue. If significant changes to a regime are required, renegotiation may be called for. 
Otherwise, adjustments may be reflected in the need for additional domestic rule-making. 
Figure 1. The Post-Agreement Negotiation (PAN) Process 
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Literature Review. Numerous correlates of acceptance or delayed acceptance of negotiated 
treaties have been advanced in the research literature. They can be classified into four categories: 
treaty- or issue-specific, extraneous, process, and status factors. Among treaq- or issue-specific 
factors, the salience of treaty issues for a country can have a significant impact on the speed of 
ratification, Using quantitative methods, Smart and Murray (1984) positively linked the extent of 
drug problems in countries with increased likelihood of ratification of international drug control 
treaties. The provisions of treaties, and the particular ways they are written, can also have major 
impacts on ratification chances (Weissbrodt, 1982). Reviewing United Nations mechanisms for 
encouraging the ratification of human rights treaties, he found that particularly vague and ambiguous 
phrasing, unclear roles for proposed and existing structures and procedures, and incompatibility with 
extant domestic legislation can all threaten the success of ratification negotiations. 
Several researchers suggest that the lack of sufficient public pressure mobilized specifically 
to attain treaty ratification, as well as targeted opposition by industry or political groups are likely 
to yield extensive delays in the process (Lang, 1992; Nowak, 1992). The formation of stakeholder 
coalitions that assume a blocking strategy can result in impasse and nonacceptance. Delay tends to 
work against ratification altogether, providing time for the opposition to mobilize (Caldwell, 1988). 
Opposition can take the varied form of ministries and bureaucratic departments that regard treaty 
provisions as prejudicial to their domestic missions, as well as industry and business interests that 
view certain international agreements as placing undue restrictions and causing unnecessary change 
to their customary methods of operation. Legislators are likely object to treaties that require major 
adjustments to their constituents' lifestyle and livelihood (Lang, 1992). On the other hand, Cook 
(1990) found, in a statistical analysis of 38 global environmental treaties, that organized citizen 
opinion concerning the issues in a treaty can explain faster rates of national ratification. Endicott 
(1977) concurs that public opinion was influential in finally convincing Japanese legislators to ratify 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NNPT) in the mid-1970s. 
Many researchers conclude that delay in acceptance or nonacceptance altogether has little to 
do with deliberate decisions of governments; rather, it often stems from circumstances that are 
extraneous to the substance of the treaties. Caldwell (1988), examining the ratification process for 
the Law of the Sea and CITES, points out that other issues of higher priority can displace 
consideration of a treaty on political agendas, especially when no pressing national exigency is felt. 
Endicott (1977) attributes the six year delay in Japanese ratification of the NNPT to the distraction 
of the government by other issues and by political scandals on the domestic scene which took 
precedence; the Lockheed Affair served to bring all substantive deliberations to a halt, including those 
on the NNPT. At the same time, it was primarily external events and pressure, in Endicott's view, 
that caused the Japanese parliament to push forward with the treaty acceptance process. The threats 
of economic disadvantages that might accrue from stricter fuel export regulations i n  the nuclear power 
industry, political disadvantages of holding only observer status in the treaty review conference, and 
publicly-stated concern over Japan's true nuclear intentions from several major countries influenced 
the process of ratification positively. On the other side of the coin, Soviet military actions in 
Afghanistan and Cuba became politically linked to the ratification negotiations concerning the SALT 
I1 treaty in the U.S. Senate, highly politicizing the treaty issue and effectively killing approval 
(Caldwell, 1991). 
Extraneous factors influencing ratification debates can also pit the treaty against domestic 
politics. Greilsarnmer (1991) probed the reasons behind the initial non-ratification and subsequent 
ratification of the EEC-Israel Protocols by the European Parliament in 1987-88. Ratification of this 
trade agreement became intimately intertwined with an attempt by the Parliament, after the Single 
Europe Act (1986), to affirm and strengthen its political role in Community decision-making. 
Moreover, the Parliament attempted to use the protocol ratification process to obtain a significant role 
in the search for peace in the Middle East. Another potent domestic element that threatens ratification 
negotiations is the fear that acceptance of international commitments risks national sovereignty 
(Weissbrodt, 1982). 
Another important category of factors influencing ratification negotiations are process 
elements. Schachter, et al. (1971) examined the acceptance patterns for 81 multilateral UN treaties 
in one of the few broadly based cross-sectional research efforts on the subject and concluded that 
process factors dealing with administrative problems and the incapacity of economic and human 
resources at a national level to implement treaty provisions can play significant roles in creating 
deadlock. Starke (1989) concurs that the need for protracted administrative work prior to ratifying 
a treaty and the limited time available to debate acceptance in parliamentary bodies can often yield 
delay. Referencing a report written for the League of Nations on problems with ratification 
negotiations, he identified the absence of thorough preparatory work back home, the need for new 
national legislation, and the need for increased public expenditures as being most influential in 
producing stalemate. 
The nature of the political process -- its degree of openness and centralization -- is often 
associated with the ease with which treaties can be ratified. A commonly held belief is stated by 
Nowak (1992): that centralized and autocratic political systems have a greater capacity than open 
pluralistic systems to ratify treaties quickly when they see it in their political interests to do so. 
In another analysis of Japanese NNPT ratification negotiations, Cho (1981) focuses on the 
importance of yet a different process element: leadership. The functional and positional centrality of 
the Prime Minister is credited with successful ratification negotiations. His personal abilities to build 
consensus and his leadership style played a central role. Supportive of these findings, Caldwell 
(1991) suggests that the SALT I1 treaty in the U.S. failed to be ratified because of negative executive- 
congressional relations and lack of strong presidential leadership. 
Schachter, et al. (1971) identified several options to reduce delay and improve the national 
process of ratification: greater involvement of parliamentarians in the delegations that negotiate 
treaties in the first place, better coordination of treaty documents and materials for legislatures, 
facilitative roles played by the parties that negotiated the treaty, and special consultation committees 
formed between diplomats and legislatures to ease the transition from international negotiation to 
domestic ratification. 
The fourth category of factors that influence ratification delay are status factors. Linkages 
have been established between country characteristics and the length of time needed to ratify 
international treaties. Both Smart and Murray (1984) and Schachter, et al. (1971) found that newer 
UN member states rarely ratified treaties, but older UN member countries were more likely to ratify. 
Ratifications are more common among developed than developing countries and among those with 
a high quality of life; are not more common among larger countries nor among those with higher 
spending on health and education; and are more common among countries that have ratified more 
international treaties in the past (Smart and Murray, 1984; Cook, 1990). Based on their statistical 
analysis, these authors believe it is possible to forecast the likelihood of ratification of future dmg 
control treaties based on a country's life expectancy, degree of economic development, and degree 
of drug problem. 
Hypotheses. On the basis of this literature, several working hypotheses were formulated 
concerning the relationships between situational factors and treaty ratification. Few have been tested 
systematically across the range of international environmental treaties currently in force. 
(1) Europe, during the period under study, is a mixture of pluralistic and autocratic political 
systems, with differing rates of economic growth and different legal and law-making systems. It is 
conceivable that the ratification process -- the domestic negotiation among various stakeholders -- 
operates very differently across these different types of political systems. It is hypothesized that open 
pluralistic systems are more likely to yield deadlock and delay in ratification, especially because of 
the public debate and negotiation that ensues. Highly centralized and closed systems, on the other 
hand, have the capacity to ratifi treaties quickly, provided it is viewed in the national interest. 
(2) The level of public concern across environmental issues differs from country to country. 
As well, public concern is likely to vary depending on whether the salient environmental issues are 
local or international in terms of their consequences. When public concern over environmental issues 
is high, public pressure can be effectively mobilized on parliamentary bodies that are empowered with 
ratifying international treaties. This pressure can be a positive force in reducing ratification time, 
taking the form of catalytic initiating actions, lobbying, education, and implementation assistance. 
(3) A population's quality of life is strongly related to the state of the environment. If a 
country's quality of life is high, concern over environmental problems should also he high, and public 
pressure to mobilize eflective political action to ratijj environmental treaties should follow. 
(4) Political recognition of environmental issues by the development of environmental 
legislation, the establishment of government agencies to deal with environmental issues, and increases 
in public expenditures on environmental concerns denote a degree of issue saliency. The more salient 
the issue, the more likely parliamentarians will be motivated to ratify international treaties quickly. 
Thus, as public expenditures on environmental protection increase, the greater the likelihood that 
national acceptance of international environmental treaties will be expedited. 
(5) A country's wealth enhances its capacity to implement often stringent international treaty 
provisions. I f  the wealth and resources exist to comply and there is the political willingness, the 
negotiation process leading to national acceptance and ratification is likely to be facilitated. 
Problem Context: International Environmental Treaties 
Chayes (1991), discussing the negotiations to develop a framework convention on climate 
change, indicates that realistically, "it will be years, perhaps decades, before agreed limitations on 
greenhouse gas emissions are legally in effect" (p. 61). The ratification process for the convention 
would take years to complete and then protocols that specify particular emission targets would still 
have to be negotiated. These, too, would certainly take time to ratify and then put into force. 7-he 
international mechanisms required to monitor compliance with the provisions of these protocols would 
also have to be negotiated and implemented, thus adding yet more years before a stable global regime 
to curb greenhouse gases is operational. This slow-paced process of international cooperation is 
juxtaposed in sharp contrast with a scientific problem whose consequences may hecome irreversible 
by the time agreed upon limits become effective. 
While negotiated environmental agreements have perhaps been more prone to lagging 
implementation in comparison to negotiated agreements in other issue areas, the problem is likely to 
get worse in the future. The distinctive aspect of UNCED is its emphasis on the linkages and 
interconnectedness between environmental sectors (deforestation and climate change, for example) and 
between environmental issues and other issue areas (for example, trade and environment, development 
and environment, health and environment, and financial resources and environment). When the topics 
under negotiation are defined in such multiple issuepackages, the result is that the negotiation process 
becomes much more complex and lengthy, as does the post-agreement negotiation process of 
ratification and implementation. Solutions must address not one, but many, interacting issues and 
problems -- identifying and resolving tradeoffs across multiple issues -- in order to develop a 
comprehensive packaged agreement. 
Issue complexity in negotiated agreements is likely to result in implementation difficulty in 
the post-agreement negotiation process. While it is often very difficult for negotiators to strike 
multiple issue deals at the international bargaining table, they can face almost insurmountable 
impasses when they return home to defend the final text at ratification hearings. Negotiators 
representing their countries before an international forum may be sufficiently flexible to reach an 
agreement. But stakeholders back home (such as ministry bureaucrats, political parties, business, 
unions, citizen lobbies, etc.) may be much more hard-nosed and tough as internal domestic 
negotiators, responsible for approving and implementing the product of international negotiation. If 
these domestic actors were not involved i n  the prior international negotiation phases -- especially in 
terms of framing the issues and clarifying national interests -- their perspectives may not be accounted 
for in the negotiated settlement itself. 
The new UNCED-inspired approach of defining issues in terms of their linkages is certain 
to result in bundled agreements that extend across various interest domains, and likely to make future 
environmental agreements more complex. Such multi-issue treaties will be more prone to deadlock 
in their implementation than their single issue counterparts. And what is the use of carefully 
negotiating a regional or global pact if the interested parties cannot or will not implement the agreed 
provisions at a national level? 
UNCED and, in particular, Agenda 21, the global action plan agreed to at the Conference, 
establish a mandate for a system of follow-up negotiations on a wide range of sustainable development 
issues. As part of this mandate, a new Sustainable Development Commission within the U N  
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) is being established to provide an institutional framework 
for the coordination of future negotiation and agreement implementation activity. These post- 
agreement negotiations constitute a continuing process toward gaining international cooperation on 
environmentdevelopment issues. During this period, the international community must implement 
its agreements, develop international regimes, deal with domestic negotiations on implementation, 
monitor and verify compliance, and continue to negotiate protocols as enhanced scientific data on 
these issues are revealed. 
Approach 
A systematic diagnostic analysis of opportunities and difficulties encountered across a wide 
spectrum of environmental treaties should produce a set of factors that explain effective and 
problematic post-agreement negotiation processes. In this paper, we conduct such an analysis for the 
first subprocess of ratification. While ratification of a treaty certainly does not indicate compliance 
with the provisions of the agreement, it does suggest a willingness and intent to comply, suhjrzct to 
many political, social, and economic factors that may intervene in the post-agreement phase. 
The effort takes the form of a comparative, cross-sectional study in which hasic patterns are 
derived about ratification problems by evaluating a large number of agreements and key factors that 
led to them (a similar approach was used hy Schachter, Nawaz, and Fried, 1971). The analysis seeks 
to develop an inventory of useful generalizations about the post-agreement negotiation process through 
assessment of many cases. 
Two empirical diagnoses are reported here. Both operationalize the dependent variable in 
terms of the time elapsed for ratification or official national acceptance of a treaty. The first 
hypothesizes that as issue complexity increases in a negotiated agreement, ratification time will also 
increase. It suggests that elements inherent in the negotiation and the agreement itself can be useful 
in explaining the average time required to ratify treaties. The second study hypothesizes that several 
political and economic factors outside of the negotiation-process play major roles in influencing the 
speed of national ratification and acceptance of international environmental treaties. The saliency of 
these situational factors is exemplified in this study. 
For both studies, data were collected across a large number of international environmental 
agreements concerning the extent of ratification delay. Using the inventory of treaties catalogued by 
the United Nations Environment Program (totaling 152 agreements) hetween 192 1 and 1989 (UNEP, 
1991), a sample of treaties was selected (see below) and the time required to ratifylaccept each treaty 
for each signatory nations was measured as the time elapsed between the date of adoption and the date 
of entry into force for each party. 
Issue Complexity and Ratification Delays 
The working hypothesis tested in this study postulates that issue complexity in the negotiated 
agreement is likely to increase post-agreement implementation problems, in particular, the average 
time required to ratify treaties. Data were collected on 33 environmental treaties catalogued hy the 
United Nations Environment Program between 1921 and 1989 that were concerned with international 
(not regional) environmental issues, where membership was universal (not restricted to certain 
countries), and where the agreement was already in force. Treaties were the unit of analysis (n= 33). 
For the dependent variable, the number of years of delay in ratification was averaged over the number 
of countries that ratified each treaty. The independent variable -- issue complexity -- was 
operationalized in terms of whether the agreement concerned a single issue or multiple issues. To 
measure this, it was necessary to refer to the complete text of each agreement in the sample and code 
the principal issues dealt with. The full texts were available in Kiss (1983) and Rummel-Bulska and 
Osafo (1991). Analysis yielded some revealing findings about the nature and extent of ratification 
problems. 
1.  Is ratification really a problem? Environmental treaties do indeed require a long time 
frame for ratification, a period before implementation of the provisions can even he considered. The 
average length of time to ratify across the sample of 33 treaties is 5.8 years. I n  many cases, the 
scientific consequences of waiting can be disastrous and the environmental damage incurred 
irreversible. 
2. Is the problem getting worse? The results here are encouraging. Our historical sample 
suggests a trend toward shorter average times to ratify (see Figure 2). This pattern can be attributable 
to improved communication among countries, the establishment of international organizations, and 
the growing legal precedent, which all serve to educate nations of the urgency of implementing 
environmental agreements so as to begin containment or conservation actions. However, during the 
1980s, the waiting period for ratification still averaged close to 3 years! 
Figure 2. Avemge Time to RahB Environmental Agreements over Seven Decodes 
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those dealing with the prevention or control of pollution, worker health, and industry regulation (see 
Table 1). These three categories, in particular, involve the establishment of restrictions and 
limitations on current industrial activity. Restrictive provisions, aimed largely at economic interests, 
apparently activate influential business stakeholders to get involved in domestic negotiations over 
ratification, thereby prolonging debate and staving off implementation of treaty provisions. 
Table 1. Ratrjication lime by Issue Category 
Average Number 
Cateaorv of Anreement of Years to Ratify 
Liability for environmental accidents (n = 4) 
Disarmament and pollution control (n = 5 )  
Conservation (n = 5) 
Commercial exploitation of resources (n = 3) 
Pollution prevention or control (n = 6) 
Worker health and pollution control (n =6)  
Conservation and regulations on industry (n =4)  
4. Is r i m  to ratifir afirnction of the issue complexity of an agreement? There is a significant 
difference in the average time to ratify between single and multi-issue treaties (4.75 years and 7.2 
years, respectively), suggesting that issue complexity is a major contributing factor to delay and 
possible rejection of internationally negotiated environmental agreements that nerd to be implemented 
at a national level. 
Situational Influences on Ratification Delays 
A systematic assessment of the situational correlates of ratification delays should yield further 
insight into the factors that facilitate and inhibit this post-agreement process. 
Data Collection. In this analysis, a sample of 61 international environmental treaties was 
selected from the UNEP registry (1991). They all met the following criteria: adoption after the 
landmark 1972 Stockholm Conference on the environment, substantive interest for and participation 
by European countries, and entry into force status. Unlike the study on issue complexity reported 
earlier, a data base structured so as to use countries as the unit of analysis was developed. This 
enabled independent variables -- the situational factors -- to be gathered and analyzed on a country-by- 
country basis. The resulting sample (n=31) included 30 European countries and the European 
Community, which took on the formal responsibility of signing treaties in the name of its member 
states in 1987, The average time to ratify treaties -- the dependent variable -- was calculated for each 
country across the entire set of treaties in the sample to which it was a signatory. 
Several independent variables were measured for each country. They include public opinion 
at the local, national and international levels, the wealth of a country measured by the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP), the quality of life as indicated by the Human Development Index (HDI), and the 
percentage of total public appropriations spent on research and development (R&D) for environmental 
protection.' 
Treaty content was coded as an intervening variable. The 61 treaties were categorized into 
issue categories, so as to gauge the importance of issues and the impact they may have on the time 
required for acceptance. Most of the treaties were multi-issue, and thus fell into more than one 
category. The issue categories are: Conservation and protection, riparian and marine pollution, 
Data on public opinion of environmental problems was drawn from OECD (1991a), on public R&D 
expenditures for environmental protection from OECD (1991b), the Human Development Index (HDI) from 
UNDP (1991). The HDI index for 1991 was used for this analysis. All the countries of Europe in this sample 
were in the "high human development" group with the exception of Romania, which was in the "medium human 
development" group. Data on GDP per capita (1985-88) was taken from UNDP (1991). Public R&D 
expenditures (in million US$ at 1985 prices and purchasing power parities as a per cent of total R&D budget 
appropriations) for environmental protection in 17 European countries was taken from OECD (1991b). The 
midpoint selected for the data was 1981. Data on public opinion on environmental problems (OECD, 199 la) 
was gathered for 14 European countries and the EC for the period 1988-90. It represents the percentage of 
persons "very concerned" about environmental problems at the local level (on waste disposal, drinking water 
quality and air pollution); at the national level (on water and air pollution); and at the international levzl (on 
the depletion of world forest and natural resources and possible climate changes brouphl about by CO,). 
Separate measures were available for each of these levels and issue areas. 
atmospheric degradation, nuclear and security issues, restrictions on commerce and industry, and 
information exchange and technical cooperation. 
Descriptive Findings. Across the entire sample of countries, the average number of years 
required for the acceptance of environmental treaties ranged between 3.0 and 6.5 years, averaging 
4.2 years (see Figure 3). There is no obvious pattern in the array of countries in  the figure -- from 
short to long ratification times. The hypothesis that the degree of pluralism or centralism in the 
political system has anything to do with the speed of treaty ratification can be dismissed by these data. 
Small states and Eastern European countries, open and pluralistic systems and closed autocratic 
systems, were not limited to one end of the scale, but were distributed across the range. 
The sample was also analyzed by blocs of nations: the European Community (EC), European 
Free Trade Association (EFTA), Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, CSSR, GDR, Hungary, Poland, Romania, 
Yugoslavia), and small stateslprincipalities (Cyprus, Liechtenstein, Malta, Monaco. San Marino) with 
populations of less than 1 million. It was anticipated that the characteristics of different blocs would 
influence ratification time. However, there were no statistically significant differences between the 
mean number of years required for acceptance across these blocs. It can be surmised that while the 
democratic parliamentary and public lobbying processes in the EC and EFTA blocs slowed down 
ratification, so too, bureaucratic stakeholders in the Eastern bloc impeded the treaty acceptance 
process. The great differences between pluralistic and autocratic governmental systems made little 
difference in the outcome concerning treaty ratification. In fact, interest groups of very different sorts 
had very similar effects on the outcome. 
There were a few findings, though, that are exceptions from this pattern. One significant 
difference in means (t-test, p < .006) was found between Nordic countries and the rest of Europe: 3.5 
years to ratify versus 4.3 years, respectively. This result might be explained by the outspoken 
concern of the Nordics on environmental issues. The role played by international environmental 
problems as salient political issues for the Nordic nations appears to be a key driver in speeding up 
the ratification process there. 
Another interesting finding (see Table 2) is the statistically significant difference in means 
across the four blocs for atmospheric treaties (ANOVA, F-test, p < .012). This type of treaty tended 
to be ratified quickly by small states and labored over by the Eastern European states. Perhaps the 
small states feeling threatened by atmospheric degradation, but not being required to pay many of the 
costs of reversing the problem, responded quickly to accepting these not so demanding glohal 
commitments. On the other hand, it is understandable that Eastern Europe, being among the most 
flagrant polluters on the continent, would delay ratification and the accompanying commitments to 
reduce toxic atmospheric emissions. 
Overall, ratification of atmospheric treaties occurred much faster on the average than other 
categories of environmental treaties (see Table 2). This may be due to the fact that treaties dealing 
with the atmosphere in Europe received considerably more media exposure, NGO lobbying, and input 
from the scientific community than other categories of treaties (Benedick, 1991). 
Analysis. Table 3 presents the correlational results between the time to ratify treaties and the 
several situational variables in the study. Pearson correlation coefficients were calculated across an 
all country-all treaty data base, as well as an all country-issue specific data base to determine if the 
content of the treaty had any special impact on the time needed to ratify it. 
Several significant relationships were identified across all treaties. Countries with a higher 
GDP are more likely to ratify environmental treaties faster than those with lower GDPs (r=-.340). 
A country's wealth is associated with greater resources and a greater capacity to implement treaty 
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Due to  multiple coding of treaties into the six issue categories, the mean ratification time across treaty categories does not average to  4.2 years. 
TREATY 
CATEGORIES 
Conservation 
Marine & Riparian 
Atmospheric 
Degradation 
Nuclear & 
Security 
Commerce & 
Industry 
Info Exchange &.Tech 
Cooperation 
A verage Ratification Time 
by Bloc 
EC 
In=13) 
4.509 
5.598 
2.658 
4.038 
3.969 
3.727 
4.3 
EFTA 
(n = 6) 
3.464 
6.528 
2.663 
4.231 
3.208 
3.598 
3.7 
Average 
Ratification 
Time by 
Treaty 
Issue** 
4.1 
5.2 
2.5 
3.9 
4.1 
3.7 
4.2 
Eastern Europe 
In = 7) 
3.460 
4.607 
3.195 
3.607 
4.664 
3.647 
4.1 
Small 
States 
(n = 5) 
4.567 
3.338 
1.080 
3.667 
4.900 
3.787 
4.5 
Table 3. Situahnal Correlates of Treaty Ratifcahahon Time by Treaty Category (pearson correlation coefficients) 
Independent Variables 
R&D Expenditures 1981 
R&D Expenditures 1989 
Human Development 
Index 
GDP per capita (1 985-8) 
Public Concern, Air, 
Local 
Public Concern, Waste, 
Local 
Public Concern, Water, 
National 
Public Concern, Air, 
National 
Public Concern, Forestry, 
International 
Public Concern, Climate 
Change, International 
Info. Ex. & 
Technical 
Coop. 
Treaties 
.064 
- .I90 
- .670 
- ,538 
.344 
.815 
-.I81 
- .015 
- .I95 
- .368 
All Treaties 
-. 104 
-.I19 
-.I68 
- .340 
.268 
.768 
.045 
.086 
- .377 
- .492 
Nuclear & 
Security 
Treaties 
- .222 
-.I92 
-.I81 
.232 
.010 
.272 
-.I50 
.019 
- .274 
- .417 
Commerce 
& Industry 
Treaties 
1 55 
- ,044 
- .509 
- ,469 
,300 
.516 
.478 
.369 
-.I41 
-.I37 
Conservation 
Treaties 
185 
- .094 
- .489 
- .285 
.374 
.818 
- .I50 
,061 
-.I44 
- .388 
Marine & 
Riparian 
Treaties 
- .492 
- .413 
- .433 
- ,325 
- .024 
1 87 
- .304 
- .I90 
- .260 
- .382 
Atmospheric 
Degradation 
Treaties 
.225 
.017 
- .505 
.I14 
.315 
.637 
-.I11 
,025 
-.419 
- .321 
provisions. This finding corresponds with those of Smart and Murray (1984) indicating that higher 
economic development covaries with faster treaty ratification. 
Another significant finding deals with the impact of public opinion on treaty ratification times. 
An interesting dichotomy arose in the results: when public concern is strongly focused on local 
environmental issues, the time to ratify international environmental treaties increases (r= .268 and 
.768 for local air and local waste disposal problems, respectively). However, when public concern 
is strongly focused on international environmental issues, ratification time decreases (r = -.377 and 
-.492 for international forestry and climate change issues, respectively). Intense public interest on 
local environmental problems can distract attention from the more global issues which are the sub.iect 
of international treaties, evoking less public pressure on parliamentary bodies charged with 
ratification. When political attentions are concentrated on local issues, sufficient additional resources 
may not be available to deal with international issues (Winharn, 1992). On the other hand, when 
public interest is mobilized on international environmental problems, it is often effective in pressuring 
political bodies into ratifying international treaties. 
Reviewing the results on an issue-specific basis, we generally find that the same relationships 
hold. In addition, the Human Development Index -- a measure of quality of life -- covaries with 
ratification time on a treaty-specific basis. For each type of treaty, except for nuclear and security 
treaties, if a country's quality of life is high, the time to ratify tends to decrease. Environmental 
problems are certainly a major element of a country's quality of life; public interest and pressure on 
political bodies is likely to be aroused in those countries with higher indices. 
The other category of situational factor -- public research and development (R&D) 
expenditures on environmental problems -- is highly correlated with the ratification time for only 
marine and riparian treaties. If the R&D expenditures are high, the time to ratify is likely to decrease 
(r=-.492 and -.413, for expenditures in 1981 and 1989, respectively). Government spending on 
environmental problems is a good indicator of issue recognition and attention at a political level -- 
an indicator acknowledging issue salience by a country. Government spending indicates political 
recognition that the environment is a significant problem and that it must be confronted and acted 
upon. Part of that required action is domestic public spending; another part is ratification and 
implementation of international treaty provisions. We find that this relationship holds only in the case 
of marine and riparian treaties: as issue salience increases, ratification time decreases. Why only for 
these types of treaties? Accords on marine and riparian issues have a long tradition in Europe and 
specifically affect agricultural, fishing, and heavy industries. Perhaps the interested economic 
stakeholders in this issue area in particular placed special pressure on parliamentary bodies to ratify 
treaties to maintain and continue high public R&D expenditures. 
Comparing the results across treaty areas, it is interesting to note that treaties concerning the 
environmental impacts of nuclear and security problems demonstrate different patterns on ratification 
time. Except for correlations between ratification time and public opinion measures, these treaties 
do not exhibit the same types of results as is found with other treaty categories. Being so closely 
linked with treaties in the military security and nuclear areas, perhaps these treaties display trends that 
are more typical of those issue areas than of environmental issues. 
Summary and Conclusions 
This analysis demonstrates clearly that when international civil servants, whose function it is 
to implement and monitor national compliance with environmental agreements, complain that very 
long time lapses occur before treaty signatories do anything, they are usually not exaggerating. There 
is a systematic problem in ratifying international environmental treaties manifested by long delays. 
Of all the different types of international environmental treaties, those dealing with atmospheric 
degradation are ratified quickest (2.5 years) and those dealing with marine and riparian issues, more 
than twice that (5.2 years). A key element of this problem is the very structure of modern 
environmental treaties: they tend to be integrated, complex packages of multiple linked issues. While 
such packages are difficult to negotiate internationally, they are perhaps even more difficult to deal 
with in the post-agreement ratification negotiations that ensue domestically among local stakeholders. 
Several situational factors covary and appear to contribute to ratification delay: strong public 
concern on local environmental problems, low quality of life, low national wealth, and low public 
R&D expenditures on environmental problems. Country size and various blocs of countries appear 
not to be affected by these patterns. Despite major differences in political systems between pluralistic 
and autocratic, local stakeholders press nevertheless for their interests in domestic negotiations over 
ratification, yielding significant delays. 
What can be done? Given the innovation introduced by UNCED -- the framing and 
negotiation of environmental issues as clusters of multiple linked issue areas -- a critical implication 
of our study is that future environmental negotiations may be threatened by ineffective and lengthy 
post-agreement negotiation processes. Several remedial actions are suggested. First, perhaps the 
negotiation process in which complex multi-issue formulas are generated needs to be modified. One 
option is to provide domestic stakeholders who prolong the process with a sense of ownership over 
the tradeoffs and treaties they are being asked to ratify. This might be accomplished by including 
them on the national delegations that take part in the debates and decide on concessions at the 
international negotiation table. They can then bring back to their constituencies the rationale for 
certain provisions that otherwise might be hard to swallow. Another approach is to modify the 
structure of the accords themselves. While recognizing the reality of issue linkages, treaties can be 
creatively disentangled and formulated in ratifiable pieces. 
Second, foreign aid and investment offered for sustainable development projects through such 
mechanisms as the Global Environment Facility operated by the World Bank, the United Nations 
Environment Program, and the United Nations Development Program can help to bolster domestic 
resources and capacity to implement treaty provisions. As the analysis suggests, as resources and 
capacity increase, self-confidence in national implementation also increases, and ratification delay can 
be reduced. Foreign investment, over the longer term, is also likely to enhance the quality of life in 
developing countries, generating the tangential benefits of greater public awareness and mobilization 
of public pressure legislatures to ratify and implement treaties quickly. 
Third, perhaps a new learning process in the post-agreement negotiation process is required. 
Nongovernmental organizations, the scientific community, intergovernmental organizations, and the 
media can be encouraged to play a useful role in educating the public and national political actors 
about the issues, so that they will understand the rationale for the linkages and the solution tradeoffs 
(Sjostedt and Spector, 1993). Mobilization of public concern and awareness about international 
environmental problems has been shown to be a potent tool in stimulating ratification negotiations; 
legislative bodies respond to strongly stated public opinion. At the same time, international problems 
can be more abstract than local environmental issues and hence require redoubled educational efforts 
to generate sincere public concern. The results indicate that as recognition of environmental problems 
by policy makers increases and it becomes salient in the political arena, ratification time will decrease. 
Economic stakeholders need to be educated as well, so that they understand clearly the cost 
implications of implementing new regulations and restrictions within the context of other economic 
and environmental benefits. 
Post-agreement negotiation over ratification is the practical process by which national 
acceptance of international environmental treaties occurs in most countries. While one of its most 
prominent features is negative - delay in implementation activities, it is a necessary and, in some 
sense, cathartic process which yields, in the best of situations, consensus or at least acceptance by the 
major domestic groups who implement or must change their ways of behaving significantly. In the 
worst of cases, ratification negotiations can result in gridlock, preventing implementation all together. 
Sand (1991) and Susskind and Ozawa (1992) identify ways of averting the negative aspects 
of the ratification process. They suggest changes to the structure of solutions, for example, 
provisional treaty application, soft law options, and delegated lawmaking, which can bypass the 
ratification process. Alternatively, new approaches that change theprocess by which agreements are 
reached are offered in this paper. They seek to confront the threats to ratification in the negotiation 
process itself, providing yet another path to constructive implementation of practical solutions to 
environmental problems. 
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